We examine the economic consequences of more than 150 shareholder proposals to expense employee stock options (ESO) submitted during the proxy seasons of 2003 and 2004, the first case in which the SEC allowed a shareholder vote on an accounting matter. Our results indicate that these proposals affected accounting and compensation choices. Specifically, (i) targeted firms were more likely to adopt ESO expensing relative to a control sample of S&P 500 firms,
I. Introduction
In 2002, following a number of high profile accounting scandals, regulators, legislators, capital market intermediaries, investors, and firms began to reconsider the accounting treatment of employee stock options (hereafter, ESO). The scandals were partly attributed to an accounting rule that essentially allowed firms to report no compensation expense for ESO. 1 In particular, it was argued that the favorable reporting treatment had led to an excessive use of option-based compensation (e.g., Bodie et al. 2003; Hall and Murphy 2003) that "perversely created incentives to artificially inflate reported earnings in order to keep stock prices high and rising" (Greenspan 2002) . Indeed, subsequent studies suggested a systematic link between the use of stock options and degree of earnings management and likelihood of accounting restatements (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi, et al. 2007) . Critics also pointed to other questionable practices induced by extensive use of option-based pay such as the opportunistic timing of grant dates and opportunistic release of financial information around option grants and exercises (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Bartov and Mohanram 2004; Ferri 2005; Yermack 1997 ). The ensuing debate led eventually to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) releasing in December 2004 a revised rule, SFAS No.123R, that required all firms to expense ESO based on fair value at grant date.
As the debate escalated in the latter part of 2002, a group of shareholders (predominantly union pension funds) targeted a number of firms with a proposal requesting an advisory 1 At that time, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123 (issued in 1995) allowed a company to account for ESO using either the fair value method or the intrinsic value method (prescribed since 1972 by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25). All companies electing the intrinsic value method were required to make pro forma disclosures of net income as if the fair value based method had been applied. Under the fair value method, compensation cost is measured through an option-pricing model at the grant date, whereas under the intrinsic value method compensation cost is calculated as the difference between the firm's stock price and the exercise price on the grant date. Since the exercise price is typically set equal to the stock price on the grant date, the intrinsic value method essentially results in no compensation cost for ESO being recognized in the income statement. Until 2002, virtually all firms opted for the intrinsic value method.
shareholder vote on whether ESO should be expensed. We find that firms targeted by ESO expensing proposals were more likely to subsequently adopt ESO expensing relative to a control sample of S&P 500 firms. In particular, the presence of a proposal is associated with a 10.65 percent increase (from 5.99 percent to 16.64 percent) in the probability of adopting ESO expensing. The result is robust to a correction for endogeneity to address the concern that firms were targeted for reasons related to the likelihood of adoption.
Also, the likelihood of adoption among targeted firms increases in the degree of voting support for the proposal. Finally, we find that non-targeted firms were more likely to adopt ESO expensing when a peer firm (i.e., a firm in the same four-digit SIC industry code) was targeted by an ESO expensing shareholder proposal.
With respect to compensation practices, we find that targeted firms subsequently experienced a decrease in the level of CEO compensation relative to a control sample of S&P 500 firms.
Further analysis shows this finding to be entirely driven by the subset of targeted firms in which the proposal was approved. In particular, the approval of an ESO expensing proposal is associated with a subsequent decrease of approximately $2.29 million in CEO compensation (versus an increase of $0.34 million in non-targeted firms). Also, among targeted firms receiving a vote, there is a negative relation between approval of the proposal and the subsequent change in CEO compensation. As for the composition of CEO compensation, the percentage of total pay represented by ESO does not change for targeted firms relative to non-targeted firms. However, approval of the proposal and the change in the percentage of total pay represented by ESO are negatively related in targeted firms receiving a vote. In particular, the relative weight of ESO in CEO pay increased by 3.2 percentage points in firms in which the proposal was not approved, and decreased by 7.8 percentage points in firms in which it was approved. The results are robust to eliminating the effects of firms being targeted in both 2003 and 2004 , and to other potential drivers of compensation changes such as the contemporaneous adoption of ESO expensing.
Overall, our evidence of significant effects on CEO compensation and voluntary adoption of a key accounting method suggests a growing influence of shareholder proposals and shareholder votes on governance practices.
Our study contributes to the accounting literature that relates shareholder behavior to accounting choices. Previous research that examined the association between shareholders' composition and reporting choices generally concluded that investors exhibit a preference for particular accounting methods, in that they tend to invest in firms with certain reporting characteristics (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Bushee 2001) . However, there is little or no evidence that investors take observable actions to affect those choices. 3 We contribute to this literature by providing compelling evidence of a direct mechanism (shareholder proposals) through which shareholders not only expressed their preference for a voluntary accounting choice (the adoption 3 Bradshaw et al. (2004) find a relation between accounting choices and U.S. institutional investor ownership in a sample of non-U.S. firms, with U.S. investors exhibiting a preference for accounting methods that conform to U.S. GAAP. However, although increases in U.S. GAAP conformity precede increases in U.S. institutional holdings, increases in ownership by U.S. institutional investors are not followed by an increase in U.S. GAAP conformity. This evidence suggests that accounting choices and methods are one component of investors' preferences set, but investors do not affect the accounting choices of the firms they invest in. Park and Shin (2004) find some evidence that the presence of active institutional shareholders on the board of directors is associated with a reduction in the use of income-increasing accrual manipulations to meet earnings targets, but draw no causality inferences.
of ESO expensing) but also successfully pressured management to adopt the preferred accounting method, with spillover effects on non-targeted firms.
Our research also contributes to the literature on executive compensation. Previous studies find no evidence that compensation-related shareholder proposals during the mid-1990s
influenced the level or composition of CEO compensation (Johnson and Shackell 1997; Thomas and Martin 1999) . In contrast, we find that ESO expensing proposals were associated with subsequent changes in the level and composition of CEO pay in targeted firms in which the proposal received higher voting support. This evidence is of particular importance to policymakers debating the introduction of a mandatory advisory annual shareholder vote (known as the "say on pay" vote) on the executive compensation report included in the proxy statement. Finally, we contribute to a growing line of research on shareholder activism. In particular, our findings complement recent evidence that suggests greater influence of shareholder proposals and votes on corporate decisions in the post-SOX environment (e.g., Del Guercio et al.
2008
; Ertimur et al. 2008a; Guo et al. 2008; Thomas and Cotter 2007) . This evidence is of great relevance as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently re-examining the proxy voting process (SEC 2007) , and some critics have suggested eliminating advisory resolutions from the proxies due to their limited effects (Baue 2007) . Also, previous studies focused mostly on the impact on targeted firms; our study is the first to respond to Karpoff's (2001) call to examine the existence of spillover effects on non-targeted firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the institutional background of shareholder proposals. In Section III we develop predictions on the 4 A bill seeking to mandate a "say on pay" vote was approved by the House of Representatives in April 2007. Shortly thereafter, an analogous bill was introduced in the Senate by presidential candidate Barack Obama. Besides, between 2006 and 2008, shareholder activists led by AFSCME (a union pension fund) targeted more than 150 US firms with non-binding shareholder proposals requesting the adoption of "say on pay" (Ferri and Maber 2008) .
economic consequences of ESO expensing shareholder proposals. In Section IV, we describe the sample, discuss the motives of the proponents, and examine characteristics of the targeted firms.
In Sections V and VI, we outline our methodology and define the variables used in the tests, and analyze the effects of the proposals on firm behavior with regard to the adoption of ESO expensing and compensation choices. Section VII concludes.
II. Institutional Background: Shareholder Proposals under Rule 14a-8
Under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any shareholder continuously holding shares worth at least $2,000 (or 1 percent of the market value of equity) for one year or more is allowed to include one (and only one) proposal with a 500-word supporting statement in the proxy statement distributed by a company for its annual shareholder meeting. These proposals request a vote in favor or against a particular issue (e.g., the expensing of ESO) from all shareholders and must be submitted to the company at least 120 days before the proxy statement is mailed to shareholders prior to the annual meeting. The board of directors might persuade the proponent to withdraw the proposal (and thus avoid a shareholder vote) either by agreeing to it or by agreeing to other concessions. Alternatively, the board might request the SEC to exclude a proposal that violates certain conditions. 5 The SEC then issues a no-action letter that determines whether the proposal is to be included (sometimes in a revised format). Proposals neither withdrawn nor excluded will be included in the proxy statement and voted upon at the annual meeting by all shareholders of record as of a given date indicated in the proxy materials.
Among the reasons for shareholder proposal exclusion, two are of particular relevance to our study. First, proposals might be excluded if considered improper under the company's state laws.
Proposals binding on a company are generally regarded as improper, reflecting states' aversion to limit a board's ability to exercise business judgment and its fiduciary role. As a result, almost all proposals to the board are written as non-binding recommendations (Black 1990) . Second, proposals might be excluded if they deal with a matter related to the company's "ordinary business." Over time, the SEC has taken a more liberal stance on the interpretation of this provision. For example, since 1992 the SEC has allowed proposals on executive pay, originally excluded as deemed to be dealing with "ordinary business" (Johnson and Shackell 1997) .
Accounting matters were not the subject of shareholder proposals until the summer of 2002, when shareholders targeted a number of firms with a non-binding proposal to expense ESO (see Section IV). In July 2002, one of the targeted firms, National Semiconductor, requested that the SEC omit the proposal on the basis that the choice of accounting methods represented an "ordinary business" matter. The SEC staff concurred with this view. This decision raised criticism among observers, however, and in December 2002 the SEC reversed its position on the grounds that the accounting treatment of ESO had become a "social policy" issue. As a result, more than 150 shareholder proposals to expense ESO were submitted during the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons. These proposals constitute the sample we analyze.
III. Empirical Predictions

Effect of shareholder proposals on the adoption of ESO expensing
In considering the consequences of the 2003-2004 ESO expensing proposals, the most immediate question is whether these proposals were eventually adopted by targeted firms, that is, whether targeted firms decided to expense ESO. The empirical evidence from the 1980s and 1990s generally indicates a weak impact of shareholder proposals on the governance practices of targeted firms (Black 1998; Gillan and Starks 1998, 2007; Karpoff 2001; Romano 2001 (Globe and Mail 2002) . Those statements were often cited by shareholders submitting ESO expensing proposals (see Appendix 2). 6 As a result, the managerial reputation cost associated with opposing these proposals was potentially quite high. Finally, unlike most shareholder proposals, ESO expensing proposals received significant voting support, nearly half garnering a majority vote (see Section IV). After the Enron-type scandals and passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the cost of ignoring shareholder proposals supported by a majority vote increased significantly as shareholder activists, governance rating agencies, proxy voting services, and the press began to 6 Aboody et al. (2004) Karpoff (2001) notes the lack of empirical analysis of spillover effects and asks: "Are non-target companies affected, for example, when other firms in the same industry…attract activist efforts?" 10 Previous research suggests that managers try to avoid scrutiny of their compensation packages. Firms paying larger amounts of compensation to their executives are more likely to (i) lobby against more explicit forms of disclosure of executive pay (Dechow et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2002) , (ii) disavow (Blacconiere et al. 2004 ) and manage downward the option expense disclosed (Aboody et al. 2006) or recognized (Johnston 2006) under SFAS 123, and (iii) have poorer voluntary disclosure of compensation practices in the proxy statements (Laksmana 2008 and reduce the degree of scrutiny. Specific actions might have included downward pressure on pay levels and a shift away from stock options towards other forms of compensation.
Second, unlike the compensation proposals presented in the 1990s, ESO expensing proposals received significant voting support. 14 As we argued leading up to Prediction 1b, we expect stronger effects in firms in which voting support for the proposals was higher.
11 Ferri et al. (2008) find that voting support for ESO expensing was higher in firms with higher use of ESO (relative to their peers), consistent with investors expecting that either the adoption of ESO expensing or the visibility of the proposal would lead firms to revise their compensation practices, and, in particular, reduce the use of ESO. 12 Johnson and Shackell (1997) analyze 169 compensation-related proposals submitted between 1992 and 1995. Most of these proposals were sponsored by individual shareholders and called for lower CEO pay, increased compensation disclosure, and independence of the compensation committee. Average voting support was 13%, with none of the proposals receiving a majority vote and no significant effect on subsequent compensation levels. Thomas and Martin (1999) analyze 168 compensation-related proposals over the 1993-1997 period and find no significant changes in the level or composition of CEO compensation. 13 The number of compensation-related proposals submitted at S&P 1500 firms jumped from 320 between to 720 between 2003 (Ertimur et al. 2008b . At the same time, activists resorted to highly publicized vote-no campaigns against compensation committee members (e.g., at Home Depot and Pfizer). The press and governance rating agencies (e.g., The Corporate Library) also contributed to keeping CEO pay in the headlines. 14 A third argument is that ESO expensing proposals had greater impact than prior compensation-related proposals because they benefited from intense media coverage. However, previous studies document a modest impact of negative press coverage on CEO compensation (Johnson et al. 1997; Core et al. 2008 An alternative view is that shareholder proposals are ineffective because they are nonbinding and can be ignored at essentially no cost to management (Karpoff et al. 1996; Wahal 1996) , in which case Predictions 1 and 2 would not be supported by the data.
IV. Sample Selection and ESO Expensing Shareholder Proposals
Primary sample. Our primary sample consists of all ESO expensing shareholder proposals To identify these proposals, we perform a keyword search of the proxy statements of all SEC registered firms using a search string of the words "Proposal" and "Expensing" within a distance of six words. We then verify this list vis-à-vis other online references (The Corporate Library, Georgeson Shareholder). We complement this search with a list of proposals submitted and withdrawn (and thus not included in the proxy statements) provided by the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBCJA). Including withdrawn proposals
(often not available to researchers) is crucial to capture the full impact of shareholder proposals on firms' behavior, one reason for withdrawal being that the firm took action to address the proponents' requests (e.g., Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999; Strickland et al. 1996) . Our search yielded 153 shareholder proposals (in 131 firms), 107 of which were voted upon at the annual meeting (Table 1 , Panel A).
Control sample. Given that 95 percent of the targeted firms are either in the S&P 500 index or larger in size than the smallest firm in the S&P 500, our control sample consists of nontargeted firms in the S&P 500, excluding those already expensing ESO as of December 2002. The resulting control sample consists of 320 firms (Table 1 , Panel B).
[ proponents, date of annual meeting, and so forth) from the proxy statement prior to, and the 10Q report following, the annual meeting. We obtained additional data from seven other sources: Below, we summarize the outcomes of the proposals, discuss proponents' motivations, and describe the characteristics of targeted firms.
Shareholder Proposals and Voting Outcome
As shown in Table 2 , Panel A, votes in favor ("Votes For") ESO expensing proposals averaged 47 percent of all votes cast, resulting in 47.7 percent of the proposals (51 out of 107)
being approved, one of the highest approval rates for a shareholder proposal (Ertimur et al. 2008a Table 2 Panel A reveals that 90 percent of ESO expensing proposals were sponsored by union pension funds that held shares in the targeted firms. The ESO expensing initiative was launched in the summer of 2002 by a group of union pension funds led by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBCJA), a representative of which told us that the objective was to persuade the FASB to reconsider the accounting treatment of ESO and proposals). These proposals included: adoption of performance-based options plans such as indexed options or options with performance-based vesting conditions (38 cases); requirement for shareholder approval of large golden parachutes (7); replacement of options with performance-based restricted stock (5); exclusion of pension income from net income in determining executive bonuses (4); prohibition of issuance of stock option grants (2); requirement that executives retain a certain percentage of equity awards (3); mandating of a cap on executive pay (2); requirement for shareholder approval of certain supplemental executive retirement benefits (2); and others (9). The average (median) percentage of votes cast in favor of these proposals was 24.4 percent (16.4 percent). Only eight of these 72 proposals received a majority vote (five proposals requiring shareholder approval of large golden parachutes, one proposal requiring shareholder approval of certain supplemental executive retirement benefits, one proposal requiring shareholder approval of all equity compensation plans, one proposal requiring exclusion of pension income from net income in determining executive bonuses). 16 The percentage of Votes For increased in 20 of the 22 firms targeted in both 2003 and 2004 (see Table 2 17 Schwab and Thomas (1998) suggest that a key objective of shareholder activism by unions (in addition to maximizing pension fund value) was greater involvement in strategic corporate decisions. By sponsoring widely supported corporate governance proposals (e.g., redemption of poison pills, declassification of boards of directors), unions had tried to enhance their credibility as sophisticated players in the investment community and capture the attention of directors often less inclined to grant them the same informal communication opportunities accorded other institutional investors.
Proponents' Motivation
In this respect, proposals to expense ESO proffered four appealing features. First, wide support for ESO expensing among institutional investors (e.g., McKinsey 2002) suggested a high probability of a successful voting outcome. Second, it represented a new, unique proposal (the first ever on an accounting issue) for which unions would be given full credit. Third, although technically focused on an accounting treatment, the initiative would attract attention to executive 17 The increasing use of shareholder proposals by union pension funds begs the question of why they file proposals rather than "vote with their feet" by selling stock in firms with an undesirable governance practice (in this case, lack of ESO expensing). However, "voting with their feet" is a more attractive option for actively managed funds in response to a firm-specific issue than for indexed funds (such as union pension funds) in response to systemic, market-wide issues (such as ESO expensing). In the second case, promoting an initiative with a potential for significant spillover effects is viewed as a superior strategy (for a discussion, see Black 1990; Del Guercio and pay and thus had the potential to affect executive pay practices, an area in which prior shareholder proposals had not been effective (Johnson and Shackell 1997; Thomas and Martin 1999) and traditionally of great interest to unions. 18 Finally, the proposal afforded unions an opportunity to influence the standard setting process on a topic of great visibility.
Characteristics of Targeted Firms
The characteristics of targeted firms are likely to reflect the proponent's motivations. Both of the unions' stated objectives, change the accounting treatment of ESO and spur debate on compensation practices, were more likely to be achieved if the proposals received high voting support, if the votes generated significant media attention, and if the target firms were regarded as broadly representative of the underlying population. The unions claimed to be targeting an approximately "random" sample of firms, but explicitly biased towards large firms more likely to receive extensive press coverage. 19 Indeed, Ferri et al. (2008) found the targeted firms to be distributed across multiple industries and about five times larger than the average Compustat firm ($27.1bn versus $5.3bn in total assets).
Using a logit regression over the two-year window 2003-2004, we try to infer empirically other targeting criteria possibly used by the proponents by comparing targeted firms with the control sample of S&P 500 firms described earlier. Following Ferri et al. (2008) , we include the Hawkins 1999). In addition, since no firm was expensing ESO until the summer of 2002, in our setting "voting with their feet" would have been equivalent to exiting the equity market. 18 In 1997 the AFL-CIO launched the Executive Paywatch Web site to monitor CEO pay trends and denounce cases of excessive pay, with emphasis on the growing gap between pay levels for CEOs and average workers. Since then, unions have been the major proponent of compensation-related proposals, accounting for 65 percent of them in -2004 (Ertimur et al. 2008a ). Most compensation-related proposals submitted during the 1990s by union funds focused on the independence of the compensation committee and levels of CEO pay, whereas over the last few years most proposals have focused on creating a better link between pay and performance (e.g., through the use of performance-based options) and giving shareholders a vote on golden parachutes and supplemental executive retirement benefits (Ertimur et al. 2008b Finally, we include a number of control variables found in prior studies to be associated with the likelihood of being targeted by shareholder proposals (e.g., Bizjak and Marquette 1998; Johnson and Shackell 1997; Karpoff et al. 1996; Strickland et al. 1996; Thomas and Cotter 2007; Wahal 1996) . These include firm characteristics such as size (natural logarithm of the market value of equity, LNMVE), growth options (market-to-book value of equity, MB), past performance (cumulative three-year stock returns, RETURNS), and leverage (debt to total assets ratio, LEVERAGE) as well as ownership and governance characteristics such as the percentage of equity held by institutional investors (INSTOWN) and executives (EXECOWN) and the percentage of the top five executives serving on the board of directors (EXECONBOARD).
[ Ferri et al. (2008) , Table 3 shows that, relative to the other S&P 500 firms, firms with higher CEO option holdings (OPTCEO), lower magnitude of disclosed ESO expense (OPTEXPENSE), and high-tech firms (HITECH) are more likely to be targeted. Targeted firms 20 Ferri et al. (2008) argue that proponents would prefer to target firms with high use of executive stock options, such as high-tech firms or firms in which CEOs hold a large amount of options, on the ground that voting shareholders in these firms would support ESO expensing as a way to curb excessive use of stock options and mitigate executives' incentives to artificially inflate earnings. They also argue that, all else being equal, proponents would target firms with lower magnitudes of pro forma option expense because some voting shareholders might vote against ESO expensing out of concern for negative effects associated with lower reported income. 21 Critics argue that unions engage in shareholder activism to gain bargaining power over future wage and benefit negotiations rather than to maximize the value of the union pension fund (Agrawal 2008) . However, in our sample, the unions sponsoring the proposals represent employees from the respective firms only in four of the 153 targeted firms. Nonetheless, to allow for the possibility that unions may strategically coordinate their activities to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, we define UNION as the percentage of unionized also tend to have higher LEVERAGE (Karpoff et al. 1996) and lower institutional ownership INSTOWN (Johnson and Shackell 1997) .
Replicating these analyses separately for 2003 and 2004, we find the results (untabulated) to be unchanged, except that RETURNS and EXECONBOARD become significantly and negatively related to a firm's probability of being targeted, consistent with prior research (Ertimur et al. 2008a; Wahal 1996) . Note that in none of these specifications does the percentage of unionized employees (UNION) appear to be a significant selection criterion. We use the logistic model in Table 3 to account for a potential selection bias in the analysis of the consequences of ESO expensing proposals.
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V. Evidence of Whether Shareholder Proposals Affect the Adoption of ESO Expensing
Research Design
To test Prediction 1a (the effect of being targeted on the likelihood to expense ESO) we employ the following logit regression: 
Our research question is whether after being targeted by an ESO expensing proposal (dummy TARGETED) a firm is more likely to voluntarily adopt ESO expensing (dummy VOLEXP=1 if the firm voluntarily expenses options, 0 otherwise). The date a firm receives a proposal is not employees, regardless of whether one of the unions representing the employees at the targeted firm is the union sponsoring the proposal. Thirteen percent of the targeted firms have at least some unionized employees. 22 The explanatory power of the model appears to be low (Pseudo R-square=0.07). Note, though, that (a) we are already implicitly controlling for size, the main selection criterion (Ferri et al. 2008) , by focusing on the S&P 500 firms, (b) a low explanatory power (after controlling for the S&P 500 membership) is consistent with the union pension funds' objective to target a random sample of firms, (c) the values of the Pseudo R-square cannot be observable. Under Rule 14a-8, a proposal must be submitted at least 120 prior to the proxy mailing date. Hence, any adoption of ESO expensing announced after this deadline is certainly occurring after the proposal was received. Adoptions announced before the deadline might have occurred before or after the targeting date. There are only seven such cases in our sample of targeted firms. We exclude three of these because they announced their decision to expense ESO more than 100 days before the deadline for proposal submission (see Table 1 , Panel A). In the other four cases, the decision was announced 7, 26, 27, and 34 days before the deadline.
Assuming that these four firms announced their decision to expense ESO after receiving the proposal, we code them as VOLEXP=1. The results are robust to their exclusion. To test Prediction 1c (the effect of the shareholder proposals on the subsequent ESO expensing decision by non-targeted firms within the same industry), we restrict our sample to non-targeted firms and replace the independent variable TARGETED in equation 1 with the indicator variable PEER_TARGETED, which is equal to 1 if at least one other firm within the naturally interpreted, there being no standard by which to assess whether the value is "large enough" (Greene 2003, 683; Long 1997, 105 We control for other potential determinants of a firm's decision to expense ESO analyzed in Aboody et al. (2004) . Voluntary adoption of ESO expensing might be used to signal favorable future prospects in firms with higher information asymmetries and capital market activity.
Hence, we predict a higher likelihood of ESO expensing in firms with higher information asymmetry (measured as a lower percentage of institutional ownership, INSTOWN) and higher capital market activity, that is, firms that issued equity to raise cash (dummy ISSUE) or acquire another firm (dummy ACQ) during the previous three fiscal years, or firms with a high debt to equity ratio (DEBTEQ) and high interest coverage (INTCOV).
Due to management's private incentives, the likelihood of expensing might be higher in cases in which the CEO bonus is a lower fraction of total pay (BONUS) and equity ownership by the CEO (CEOOWN) and outside directors (ODIRGRANTS) is higher, assuming positive valuation effects from the expensing announcement (Aboody et al. 2004) . Also, ESO expensing might be more likely in firms subject to larger political costs, measured in terms of firm size (the natural log of the market value of equity, LNMVE), profitability (net income scaled by market value of equity, PROFIT), and fraction of all options granted to the top five executives (OPTTOP5).
To complete the set of determinants of ESO voluntary adoption described by Aboody et al. (2004) , we control for the magnitude of the pro forma option expense disclosed under SFAS 123
(scaled by market value of equity, OPTEXPENSE). The relation between OPTEXPENSE and the decision to expense ESO is unclear. A higher level of OPTEXPENSE, although it results in a larger negative impact on net income, might also yield higher signaling benefits.
All the variables described above are measured at the end of 2002. Because by that time more than 200 firms had already adopted ESO expensing, we also control for the percentage of firms within the same four-digit SIC that had decided to expense ESO by the end of 2002,
PEER_VOLEXP. Finally, we control for industry effects (based on Core and Guay 1999).
Empirical Results
The univariate analyses in Table 4 are consistent with Predictions 1a and 1b. Firms targeted by an ESO expensing proposal are significantly more likely to subsequently announce their decision to voluntarily expense ESO than non-targeted firms in our S&P 500 control sample.
Likewise, among the sub-sample of targeted firms receiving a vote, the proposal's approval (resulting from a majority of votes in favor) is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of expensing ESO. There was not a single case of adoption of ESO expensing among the firms in which the proposal was not approved. Hence, to test the effect of voting outcome (Prediction 1b)
in the multivariate logit regression, we include the percentage of votes in favor of the proposal (VOTESFOR) rather a dummy variable denoting the proposal's approval. 24 When we exclude the four firms for which it is unclear whether the proposal was submitted before the announcement of the decision to expense ESO, the coefficient on TARGETED becomes 1.019 (p-value = 0.003).
To partially address the concern that firms might have been targeted for reasons related to the likelihood of expensing ESO, we incorporate a correction for endogeneity using a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we predict the probability of being targeted using the model in Table   3 . In the second stage, we use the predicted probabilities (TARGETED_HAT) in place of the TARGETED dummy. The sample size drops from 409 to 346 observations due to missing variables in the first stage. Our main result is confirmed: the coefficient on TARGETED_HAT remains positive (+5.379) and significant (p-value=0.045).
In Model 2, the coefficient on VOTESFOR is also positive (+21.21) and statistically significant (p-value=0.028), indicating a higher frequency of adoption among firms in which the proposal received higher voting support, consistent with Prediction 1b.
26
In Model 3 we examine the effect on non-targeted firms only when a peer firm is targeted by a proposal. The positive and significant coefficient on PEER_TARGETED (+0.70, with pvalue=0.099) suggests a statistically higher likelihood of voluntary adoption of ESO expensing by non-targeted firms when peer firms are targeted, providing support for Prediction 1c. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient implies that the presence of a peer firm targeted by a proposal is associated with an increase of 2.76 percent in the probability of subsequent adoption of ESO expensing (from 2.87 percent when PEER_TARGETED=0 to 5.63 percent when
PEER_TARGETED=1).
27 25 We obtain this estimate assuming that all the independent variables other than TARGETED are equal to their sample means. If the independent variables are assumed to be equal to their sample median (rather than mean) values, the estimated increase in probability is 8. 
VI. Evidence of Whether Shareholder Proposals Affect CEO Compensation
Research Design
To examine whether ESO expensing proposals affect CEO pay practices at targeted firms (Prediction 2), we compare changes in the level and composition of CEO pay at targeted and S&P 500 control sample firms. We exclude firms hiring a new CEO to avoid the effect of onetime compensation choices (e.g., severance payments to outgoing CEOs, mega-grants to incoming CEOs). Also, firms targeted only in 2003 are not part of the control sample for 2004.
(a) Change in the level of CEO compensation
To test the impact of the ESO expensing proposals on the level of CEO compensation (Prediction 2a), we regress the change in CEO compensation (∆LNCEOCOMP it ), measured as the value of the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation 28 at firm i in fiscal year t minus the value in t-1, on a dummy indicating whether the firm was targeted by a proposal to be voted on in fiscal year t-1 (TARGETED it-1 ) and a number of control variables. assume that changes in pay will be reflected in the year after the proposal is (or was supposed to be) voted upon. As a significant proportion of CEO pay is determined at the beginning of each fiscal year, changes are unlikely to occur until the following year (Core et al. 1999 ).
Previous research finds widespread evidence that performance measures, particularly stock price returns and earnings, are commonly used in compensation contracts (Lambert and Larcker 28 Total compensation is defined as the sum of the CEO's salary, bonus, value of restricted stock granted, BlackScholes value of options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other forms of annual compensation.
1987 ; Murphy 1999; Sloan 1993) . We account for changes in performance by including controls for stock returns (RET) and changes in the return on assets (∆ROA). We also control for variables identified in prior studies as key determinants of executive pay: size (the natural logarithm of total assets, LNSIZE), market-to-book value of equity (MB), R&D expenditures (scaled by total assets, R&D), and CEO percentage ownership (CEOOWN). Many studies find that larger firms provide higher CEO compensation, consistent with the notion that these firms have higher monitoring costs and require more skilled managers (e.g., Gabaix and Landier 2008; Rosen 1982 ). Higher levels of executive pay have also been documented in firms with higher growth options and firms with more R&D (e.g., Cheng 2004; Smith and Watts 1992), perhaps because these firms require higher quality managers and make greater use of risky pay (requiring a higher risk premium). Finally, although greater CEO ownership might better align CEO interests with those of shareholders, resulting in lower compensation (Core et al. 1999) , it might also enable CEOs to exercise more power in negotiating their compensation, resulting in higher pay. We do not have directional predictions for these variables because our dependent variable is defined in terms of changes rather than levels. Nonetheless, we include the level of these variables to allow for the possibility of an effect on changes in CEO pay (Baber et al. 1996) . In robustness tests, we redefine these control variables in terms of their change over the year prior to the proposal.
(b) Change in the composition of CEO compensation
We test the impact of ESO expensing proposals on the weight assigned to ESO in the CEO compensation contract. This analysis is useful for two reasons. First, it helps us to understand whether the source of any change in compensation level is due to less use of ESO. Second, it allows for the possibility that ESO expensing proposals affected the composition of CEO pay, even if the level of total compensation was not affected. 
We include several control variables related to the use of stock options. Because stock option compensation might be used as a substitute for cash compensation in firms with cash constraints (Core and Guay 1999; Yermack 1995) , we control for the degree of cash flow shortfall (CASHSHORT), calculated as [(common and preferred dividends + cash flows from investmentcash flows from operations) / total assets]. Monitoring is more difficult in firms operating in noisy environments (Yermack 1995) , resulting in greater reliance on stock option compensation.
On the other hand, managerial risk aversion implies that the use of stock options in the compensation package will increase at a decreasing rate relative to noise (Core and Guay 1999) .
We control for the effect of noise by using the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of a firm's monthly stock returns during the fiscal year t-1 (STDRET). Finally, as in regression (2), we control for LNSIZE, MB, R&D, and CEOOWN. Firm size, growth, and R&D intensity are associated with higher monitoring costs, which lead to greater use of stock options. CEO ownership, on the other hand, is typically related to fewer agency conflicts resulting in less reliance on stock option compensation (Baber et al. 1996; Core and Guay 1999; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Smith and Watts 1992; Yermack 2004) . Again, we make no directional predictions for these control variables.
We use OLS regressions to test equations 2 and 3, and include all companies in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We include firm random effects to mitigate serial correlation in residuals.
To test the effect of the voting outcome (Prediction 2b), we modify equations 2 and 3 as follows. First, we split the TARGETED dummy into two indicator variables, depending on whether a vote took place, TARGETED_Vote and TARGETED_NoVote. Then we further split the TARGETED_Vote dummy into two indicator variables, depending on whether the proposal was approved or not, TARGETED_Approved and TARGETED_Not Approved.
Empirical Results
The univariate analysis in Table 6 , Panel A under "Proposal Effect" suggests that targeted firms reported a slight decrease in the average level of CEO pay (ΔCEOCOMP) in the year after receiving the proposal. This contrasts with the increase observed for the S&P 500 control firms.
However, this difference is statistically insignificant. Interestingly, a significantly higher proportion of targeted firms decided not to grant any options to their CEOs (dummy variable
NOCEOGRANT).
When we restrict our analysis to firms in which the proposal was voted on (Table 6 [TABLES 6 and 7 APPROX. HERE] The coefficient on TARGETED_Approved is also significantly more negative than the coefficient on TARGETED_NotApproved (p-value=0.012, bottom of Panel A). This result suggests a lower change in CEO compensation in firms in which the proposal was approved, also relative to the firms in which the proposal was not approved, consistent with Prediction 2b. In contrast to Prediction 2a, the results indicate an insignificant effect of being targeted (Model 1), regardless both of whether the proposal resulted in a vote at the annual meeting (Model 2) and the voting outcome (Model 3). However, the negative coefficient on TARGETED_Approved, 29 To mitigate endogeneity concerns (e.g., firms targeted for reasons related to their compensation practices), as robustness test we use a two-stage approach: in the first stage we predict the probability of being targeted using the model in Table 3 (estimated separately for 2003 and 2004) ; in the second stage we use the predicted probabilities (TARGETED_HAT) in place of the TARGETED dummy. The sample size drops from 656 to 582 observations. The coefficient on TARGETED_HAT remains negative (-0.783) although its significance becomes weak (pvalue=0.117). 30 The -0.464 coefficient on TARGETED_Approved implies that the factor by which CEO pay increases (year-overyear) in a targeted firm in which the vote was approved is 62.9 percent (e -0.464 ) of the factor by which CEO pay increases in non-targeted firms. To understand the economic significance of this result, consider that the median CEO pay in year t-1 is $6,748,700 and the predicted ∆LNCEOCOMP, holding all control variables at their mean values and setting all the TARGETED variables equal to zero, is 0.049. This means that in non-targeted firms CEO pay in year t was expected to be 105 percent (i.e., e 0.049 ) of CEO pay in year t-1 (i.e., an increase in CEO pay of $337,000). The proposal approval (TARGETED_Approved=1) is associated with a decrease in the factor by which although not significant (p-value=0.146), is significantly lower than the coefficient on TARGETED_NotApproved (see the test for difference in coefficients; p-value=0.026). In particular, holding all control variables (other than the TARGETED_ variables) at their mean values, we find that the mix of ESO in CEO pay increased 3.2 percent in firms in which the proposal was not approved (TARGETED_NotApproved=1 and TARGETED_Approved= TARGETED_NoVote=0), but decreased 7.8 percent in firms in which it was approved (TARGETED_Approved=1 and TARGETED_NotApproved= TARGETED_NoVote=0). This shift away from ESO grants in CEO pay packages in firms in which the proposal was approved relative to firms in which it was not approved is consistent with Prediction 2b.
Robustness Tests
Prior studies suggest that shareholder proposals repeatedly submitted over many years might have a stronger impact on firms' governance practices, particularly in the case of a sequence of majority votes (Ertimur et al. 2008a Prior studies also suggest that ESO expensing might have affected CEO pay practices. 31 Hence, the CEO pay changes documented in Table 7 might be due to adoption of ESO expensing by some of the targeted firms rather than to the ESO expensing proposals. To explore this possibility, we add to our explanatory variables in Table 7 Seethamraju and Zach (2003) provide some evidence that firms voluntarily adopting ESO expensing in the summer of 2002 in that same year reduced the number of options granted to their employees and their top five executives, both in absolute terms and relative to a control sample matched on industry and size. Brown and Lee (2007) document a significant reduction in the use of ESO in total compensation for top five executives as a result of our variables of interest (e.g., TARGETED in Model 1) into two indicators, one for expensing and one for non-expensing firms (e.g., TARGETED_Expense and TARGETED_No Expense).
Untabulated tests yield the following insights. First, across the various models, the dummy for voluntary expensing has no effect on changes in levels of CEO pay (Panel A), but has a negative and significant effect (p-value <0.10) on the change in composition of CEO pay (Panel B). That is, firms voluntarily expensing ESO seem to reduce the weight of stock options in the CEO pay package. Second, and most important, all our results in Table 7 hold for the subset of targeted firms not expensing ESO. This means that our results are not driven by the subset of targeted firms expensing ESO. Third, the coefficients of interest for the subset of targeted firms expensing ESO are generally insignificant. A potential explanation is that targeted firms viewed the adoption of ESO expensing and changes in CEO compensation as substitute responses to the shareholder proposals and votes. However, these results should be interpreted with caution because some of the sub-samples (e.g., targeted firms in which the proposal was approved and ESO expensing adopted) become relatively small.
Finally, when we replicate Table 7 using changes rather than levels for the control variables (other than the performance measures), all results on the variables of interest are unchanged.
In summary, Table 7 documents a negative association between ESO expensing proposals and subsequent changes in CEO pay levels and use of options in CEO pay, the association being largely due to cases in which the proposal was approved by voting shareholders. These results are driven neither by the presence of firms targeted twice nor by the contemporaneous adoption of ESO expensing by some of the targeted firms. Our evidence contrasts with previous findings mandatory ESO expensing (FAS123R), and show that such reduction resulted in a decrease in total compensation in firms with abnormally high executive compensation before FAS 123R.
of no significant consequences of pay-related shareholder proposals in the 1990s (Thomas and Martin 1999; Johnson and Shackell 1997) .
32
VII. Conclusions
Over the 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons, a group of unions and other shareholder activists targeted more than 150 firms with a proposal requesting adoption of the fair value method of accounting for employee stock options (ESO), the first time the SEC allowed shareholder proposals on an accounting matter.
We assess the economic consequences of these proposals by analyzing their association with the likelihood of expensing ESO and with CEO compensation practices in the subsequent period.
We find that the presence of a shareholder proposal was positively associated with the likelihood of adoption of ESO expensing not only by targeted firms but also by their peers in the same industry. Also, targeted firms in which the proposal was approved experienced decreases in both level of CEO compensation and relative use of ESO in CEO compensation.
Our study contributes to the accounting literature that relates shareholder behavior to accounting choices. We provide novel evidence of a direct mechanism, shareholder proposals, through which shareholders not only expressed their preference for an accounting method, but also seemed to successfully pressure firms to adopt this method, with spillover effects on nontargeted firms. Other accounting issues with social policy implications (e.g., accounting for pensions) might meet SEC requirements and become the subject of future shareholder proposals.
Our research also contributes to the literature on CEO pay. Unlike compensation-related shareholder proposals in the 1990s, we find that ESO expensing proposals often received significant voting support and, in these cases, were associated with subsequent changes in the level and composition of CEO pay. Our evidence calls for more research on the effectiveness of shareholder activism on CEO pay in the post-Enron period, characterized by closer scrutiny of CEO pay and new types of compensation-related shareholder proposals.
Finally, our work contributes to the growing literature on shareholder activism. Our evidence indicates greater influence of shareholder proposals on corporate decisions in the post-SOX environment, and highlights the need to account for spillover effects on non-targeted firms. Also, it suggests the possibility of a broader effect on the standard setting process. Shareholder proposals became a way to formalize investors' support for ESO expensing. In fact, SFAS No.123R explicitly refers to "numerous nonbinding shareholder resolutions" to expense ESO (SFAS No.123R, Appendix B, par.B26). Besides, by accelerating the rate of adoption of ESO expensing, these proposals affected the degree of comparability between voluntary adopters and other firms, one of the concerns leading to the issuance of the new standard (SFAS No.123R, Summary, par.B). In this respect, the ESO expensing initiative exemplifies the emerging role of shareholder proposals as a lobbying mechanism for influencing regulatory reform. 33 Our study might spur more research in this direction.
performance-based stock options (Wall Street Journal 2005) . These changes might have been prompted, in part, by the ESO expensing proposals and ensuing debate. 33 Two recent examples of union pension funds' initiatives also directed at influencing policy makers are the shareholder proposals asking firms to adopt a majority voting system for the election of directors (Sjostrom and Sang Kim 2007) and the shareholder proposals requesting that firms adopt an advisory vote on executive compensation reports (Ferri and Maber 2008) . The lack of option expensing can promote excessive use of options in a company's compensation plans, obscure and understate the cost of executive compensation and promote the pursuit of corporate strategies designed to promote short-term stock price rather than long-term corporate value.
A recent report issued by Standard & Poor's (2002) indicated that the expensing of stock option grant costs would have lowered operational earnings at companies by as much as 10 percent. "The failure to expense stock option grants has introduced a significant distortion in reported earnings," stated Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. "Reporting stock options as expenses is a sensible and positive step toward a clearer and more precise accounting of a company's worth. " Globe and Mail, "Expensing Options is a Bandwagon Worth Joining," Aug. 16, 2002. Warren Buffett wrote in a New York Times Op-Ed piece on July 24, 2002:
There is a crisis of confidence today about corporate earnings reports and the credibility of chief executives. And it's justified. (…) I am referring to the legal, but improper, accounting methods used by chief executives to inflate reported earnings. Options are a huge cost for many corporations and a huge benefit to executives. (…)When a company gives something of value to its employees in return for their services, it is clearly a compensation expense. And if expenses don't belong in the earnings statement, where in the world do they belong?
Many companies have responded to investors' concerns about their failure to expense stock options. In recent months, more than 100 companies, including such prominent ones as Coca Cola, Washington Post, and General Electric have decided to expense stock options in order to provide their shareholders more accurate financial statements. Our Company has yet to act. We urge your support. …Standard & Poor's recently began calculating a "core earnings" number in which the cost of options is treated as an expense… …We believe that voluntarily expensing stock options sends a signal to the market that a company is committed to transparency and corporate governance best practices.
…Expensing fixed stock option awards will also eliminate a disincentive to award indexed options, which tie compensation more closely to company rather than market or industry performance and which must be expensed. The Conference Board's Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise recently recommended that companies be required to expense fixed option awards in order to level the playing field among forms of equity-based compensation… …not expensing stock options may lead to abuse by companies that see them as "free money." As Standard & Poor's put it in its recent report, "when something is significantly underpriced, it is often also substantially overconsumed." I believe this concern is relevant to Delta, since Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest proxy advisory service, has calculated that the total potential voting power dilution of Delta's equity compensation plan stands at 32.45 percent... 
Notes:
p-values in parentheses are one-tailed for directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.
1 The model includes indicator variables denoting the firm's industry membership based on the industry classification in Core and Guay (1999) . The industry-specific intercepts are untabulated. 
1 We analyze the effects of the 2003 and 2004 proposals on changes in compensation occurring the year after the firm was targeted. In Panel B we focus on the sub-sample of targeted firms and analyze the effect of the voting outcome of the proposal on changes in compensation in the year after the vote took place. CEOCOMP = CEO Total compensation including salary, bonus, value of restricted stock granted, Black-Scholes value of options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other forms of annual compensation (item TDC1 in the Execucomp database). CEOOPTCOMP = Black-Scholes value of total options granted to the CEO divided by CEOCOMP. CEOOPTMVE = Black-Scholes value of total options granted to the CEO divided by market value of equity. TOTOPTIONS = Number of options granted by the firm to all employees during the year divided by shares outstanding. ∆CEOCOMP, ∆CEOOPTCOMP, ∆CEOOPTMVE, ∆TOTOPTIONS = Value of CEOCOMP, LNCEOCOMP, CEOOPTCOMP, CEOOPTMVE, and TOTOPTIONS in fiscal year t minus the value in fiscal year t-1. NOCEOGRANT = Dummy equal to 1 if the CEO did not receive an option grant in the fiscal year after the firm was targeted, and 0 otherwise. Core and Guay (1999) . The industry-specific intercepts are untabulated. CEOCOMP = CEO Total compensation including salary, bonus, value of restricted stock granted, Black-Scholes value of options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other forms of annual compensation (item TDC1 in the Execucomp database). LNCEOCOMP = Natural logarithm of CEOCOMP. CEOOPTCOMP = Black-Scholes value of total options granted to the CEO divided by CEOCOMP. ∆CEOCOMP, ∆LNCEOCOMP, ∆CEOOPTCOMP = Value of CEOCOMP, LNCEOCOMP, and CEOOPTCOMP in fiscal year t minus the value in fiscal year t-1. TARGETED = Dummy equal to 1 if firm was targeted for a proposal, and 0 otherwise, during fiscal year t-1. TARGETED_Vote = Dummy equal to 1 if firm was targeted in fiscal year t-1 and the proposal was voted upon, and 0 otherwise. TARGETED_NoVote = Dummy equal to 1 if firm was targeted in fiscal year t-1 but the proposal was withdrawn, and 0 otherwise. TARGETED_Approved = Dummy equal to 1 if firm was targeted in fiscal year t-1 and the proposal was approved, and 0 otherwise. TARGETED_NotApproved = Dummy equal to 1 if firm was targeted in fiscal year t-1 and the proposal was not approved, and 0 otherwise. APPROVED = Dummy equal to 1 if the proposal was approved in fiscal year t-1, and 0 otherwise. VOTESFOR = Votes in favor divided by the sum of votes in favor and votes against the ESO expensing proposal. ROA = Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets | ∆ROA=ROA in fiscal year t minus ROA in fiscal year t-1. RET = Annual stock returns. SIZE = Total assets ($MM)| LNSIZE = Natural logarithm of SIZE. MB = Market-to-book value ratio. CEOOWN = Equity shares and options held by the CEO as a percentage of shares outstanding. CASHSHORT = Cash shortage measured as [(common and preferred dividends + cash flows from investment -cash flows from operations) / total assets]. STDRET = Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the firm's monthly stock returns over the fiscal year.
